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CC Verifier Sidecar and Ready Gate — Observe Rollout (MC #105472)

CC Verifier Sidecar and Ready Gate — Observe Rollout (MC #105472)

Current state

The persistent CC verifier sidecar and exact-revision MC ready gate are installed in observe-only mode. Enforcement remains disabled; the pilot allowlist is empty and the enforcement watermark is unset. This page does not authorize pilot-enforce or enforce-new.

Accepted implementation

  • WP1 verifier core: 044c0d30e7d7e973009991d91e42b8c2f77371ce
  • WP2 identity/handoff remediation: ad28aa306350b44d568aa9c75f4502ec04634bfb
  • WP3 system source: 2cee8e17b1cbea58ba9320015e9c8cca793cb56d
  • Hook candidate: c0871b8689da0063bd2d6cca26322f702a55c0d1
  • Live system commit containing accepted WP3 bytes: 18e8ef5d257e34ebfdcb91ff806e7a377010a874
  • Live hook commit: 6c52ef129dd68008551e355ef88c97b94fe2202b

The live commits do not share normal ancestry with the isolated review branches, so acceptance is based on direct byte equivalence of candidate-owned files, not inferred ancestry.

Independent evidence

  • WP1 review: /Users/makinja/system/evidence/105474/proveo-independent-review.md
  • WP2 review: /Users/makinja/system/evidence/105479/proveo-review-identity-remediation/REPORT.md
  • Correct live Stop-hook pilot: /Users/makinja/system/evidence/105479/live-pilot-105501/REPORT.md
  • Final WP3 exact-SHA review: /Users/makinja/system/evidence/105472/proveo-wp3-system-2cee8e17/REPORT.md
  • Updated post-install acceptance: /Users/makinja/system/evidence/105472/WP3-HOOK-ACCEPTANCE-UPDATE.md
  • Independent post-install review: /Users/makinja/system/evidence/105472/proveo-wp3-postinstall/REPORT.md
  • Trusted exact-revision verdict: /Users/makinja/system/evidence/105505/cc-verifier/2cee8e17b1cbea58ba9320015e9c8cca793cb56d/verdict.json

Final post-install validation passed 82/82 focused tests, 14/14 adjacent Stop-hook tests, and the shell integration smoke. The ready hook blocks only intentional verifier exit code 2 and fails open to the existing legacy gates on infrastructure errors.

Identity and trust boundaries

  • Task identity must come from agreeing explicit trusted input, orchestrator-injected numeric MC_TASK_ID, or demonstrably session-owned metadata.
  • Unsafe, conflicting, ambiguous, stale/global-marker-only, non-positive, or larger-than-Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER IDs are rejected before MC database or revision resolution.
  • Verdicts are bound to an exact immutable revision. Any later commit invalidates PASS.
  • Verification commands and evidence roots come from trusted policy; builder-provided commands and arbitrary evidence paths are never executed or trusted.
  • Durable SQLite attestation detects accidental drift and one-artifact tampering, but is not a cryptographic boundary against a same-OS-user privileged process.

Promotion boundary

Promotion to an enforcing mode requires a separate explicit approval, a healthy attestation store, fresh attested PASS at the candidate revision, and review of observe telemetry. Historical ready_for_review backlog must never be enrolled. Rollback is configuration-only: set gate_rollout_mode to observe to remove blocking while preserving audit telemetry, or off to disable gate decisions.

title: CC Verifier Ready-Gate — Operator Runbook mc_task: 105505 parent_mc_task: 105472 status: observe (audit-only, no enforcement) project_path: /Users/makinja/system

CC Verifier Ready-Gate — Operator Runbook

Covers tools/cc-verifier-gate.ts (WP3 of MC #105472): the exact-revision check that runs before mc.js ready. This is the operator guide for the rollout lifecycle — activation, telemetry, invalidation, promotion, rollback, and fail-open behavior. It does not restate the WP3 design (see the header comment in tools/cc-verifier-gate.ts and specs/cc-verifier-sidecar-105472-plan.md).

1. Observe activation

The gate ships live with config/cc-verifier-pilot.json:

"gate_rollout_mode": "observe",
"gate_pilot_enforce_task_ids": [],
"gate_enforce_new_watermark_epoch_ms": null

In observe mode (decide() in tools/cc-verifier-gate.ts:363-365), every failing finding is recorded to the audit log but the decision is always { action: 'audit', enforced: false } — it can never block mc.js ready. observe is the only mode this pilot should run in until a human explicitly promotes it (Section 4). No code change is required to activate observe — it is the config default and the live-safe fallback if the config file is missing or unparseable (loadGateConfig() falls back to DEFAULT_GATE_CONFIG, which is also observe/empty/null).

To confirm the live config is still in the safe state:

node -e "const c=require('./config/cc-verifier-pilot.json'); console.log(c.gate_rollout_mode, c.gate_pilot_enforce_task_ids, c.gate_enforce_new_watermark_epoch_ms)"
# expected: observe [] null

2. Audit telemetry

Every checkReadiness() call appends one JSON line to the audit log (~/system/state/cc-verifier-gate-audit.jsonl in production, overridable via CC_VERIFIER_GATE_AUDIT_LOG for tests), regardless of mode or outcome:

{"ts":"...","component":"cc-verifier-gate","task_id":"...","dry_run":false,"finding":{...},"decision":{...}}

finding.reason carries the machine-readable failure code (e.g. revision_mismatch, digest_mismatch, verdict_field_tampered, stale_revision, no_verdict_found) so audit volume can be triaged by failure class. Audit writes are best-effort and wrapped in try/catch (appendAudit()) — a logging failure never changes the gate decision.

To review recent audit activity:

tail -n 50 ~/system/state/cc-verifier-gate-audit.jsonl | node -e "process.stdin.on('data',d=>d.toString().trim().split('\n').forEach(l=>{const e=JSON.parse(l);console.log(e.task_id, e.decision.mode, e.decision.action, e.finding.reason)}))"

Before promoting past observe, review the audit log for the candidate task id(s) and confirm the only findings are expected ones (e.g. a deliberately stale revision), not systemic issues like schema drift or a misconfigured MC_DB_PATH.

3. Exact-revision invalidation

A verdict is only valid for the exact revision it was computed against. evaluate() resolves the trusted current revision from --repo/--commit, explicit --repo + live git rev-parse HEAD, or (default) the MC task's tasks.project_path + live HEAD — never from the verdict itself (resolveTrustedRevision(), tools/cc-verifier-gate.ts:162-206). If the stored verdict's revision does not match the current HEAD, the finding is revision_mismatch and ok:false.

If no verdict exists at the current revision but one exists at a prior revision, the reason is stale_revision (as opposed to no_verdict_found, which means the task was never verified at all) — this is the expected signal after any new commit lands on a previously-passing task; a fresh cc-verifier run is required before the gate can pass again at the new revision.

Every evidence file hash and the top-level verdict field are also independently recomputed from the checks array and re-read evidence bytes — a hand-edited verdict.json (e.g. flipping PARTIAL to PASS, or editing a stdout/stderr file after the fact) is caught as verdict_field_tampered or digest_mismatch even when the stored revision field is untouched.

4. Promotion prerequisites (pilot-enforce / enforce-new)

Both enforcing modes are opt-in per config field and require a human edit to config/cc-verifier-pilot.json — there is no code path that auto-promotes.

pilot-enforce — blocks only task ids explicitly listed in gate_pilot_enforce_task_ids. Before adding a task id:

  1. Confirm the task has at least one verdict_status: "PASS" audit entry at its current revision (Section 2).
  2. Confirm no unexplained digest_mismatch/verdict_field_tampered entries exist for that task in the audit log.
  3. Add the task id as a string to gate_pilot_enforce_task_ids (e.g. ["105505"]). Tasks not in the list continue to audit-only (decide() line 371: not in pilot allowlist falls through to action: 'audit').

enforce-new — blocks only tasks whose MC created_at is strictly after gate_enforce_new_watermark_epoch_ms. Before setting the watermark:

  1. Run the pilot in pilot-enforce for a representative set of tasks first and confirm no false-positive blocks in the audit log.
  2. Set gate_enforce_new_watermark_epoch_ms to an epoch-ms value at or after the promotion decision time — this must be a second, independent watermark from the WP2 event-ingestion activation_watermark_epoch_ms; do not reuse or overwrite that field.
  3. Any task created at or before the watermark, or when the watermark is null/non-finite, is never eligible for blocking (decide() lines 374-381) — this is the live-safe default and must remain the fallback for any config read error.

Both modes still only ever block when finding.ok === false AND the task is enrolled/eligible; a passing finding always resolves to action: 'allow' regardless of mode (decide() line 359-361).

5. Rollback to off

To disable the gate entirely (including audit-only behavior), set:

"gate_rollout_mode": "off"

decide() line 355-357 short-circuits before evaluating the finding: off always returns { action: 'allow', enforced: false }. Note evaluate() still runs and is still written to the audit log by checkReadiness() — off only changes the decision, not whether the check executes or is recorded. To roll back from pilot-enforce or enforce-new without fully disabling audit visibility, set gate_rollout_mode back to observe instead — this preserves telemetry while immediately removing all blocking.

Rollback is a config-only change; no deploy, restart, or code change is required, since loadGateConfig() reads the file fresh on every checkReadiness() call.

6. Fail-open incident handling

The gate is fail-open by design at every layer that is not the explicit enforcing-mode decision:

  • Missing/unparseable config file — loadGateConfig() catches the read/parse error and returns DEFAULT_GATE_CONFIG (observe, empty allowlist, null watermark).
  • Unknown gate_rollout_mode value — loadGateConfig() ignores it (keeps the default observe); if an unrecognized mode value somehow reaches decide() anyway, the final fallback branch returns { action: 'audit', enforced: false, reason: 'unknown_mode_fail_open_audit' }.
  • MC db missing/locked — queryTaskRow() catches the error and returns null; resolveTrustedRevision() then returns no_trusted_project_path, which is a normal ok:false finding (still subject to the mode's decision logic — in observe this only audits).
  • Audit log write failure — appendAudit() swallows the error; it never affects finding/decision.
  • No commit/task/repo resolvable — evaluate() returns invalid_task_id or revision_undeterminable; these are ordinary findings, not exceptions, and flow through the same mode-gated decide() path as any other failure.

If an incident is suspected (e.g. unexpected blocks reported by a builder), the immediate mitigation is:

node -e "const fs=require('fs');const p='config/cc-verifier-pilot.json';const c=JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(p));c.gate_rollout_mode='observe';fs.writeFileSync(p, JSON.stringify(c,null,2))"

This reverts to audit-only without needing to identify root cause first. Then inspect the audit log (Section 2) for the affected task id(s) to determine whether the block was a correct enforcement (real tamper/stale revision) or a gate defect, before re-promoting.

7. Durable attestation store health

tools/cc-verifier.js (F1) writes one row per (task_id, revision) to a SQLite store at ~/system/databases/cc-verifier-attestations.db (overridable via CC_VERIFIER_ATTESTATION_DB for tests), recording the SHA-256 of the exact verdict.json bytes it just persisted, the verifier_identity, and written_at. This happens inside writeAtomicJSON() immediately after the verdict file is written, so a verdict and its attestation are never observed out of order by a reader.

The gate (tools/cc-verifier-gate.ts) reads this store read-only (cc.getAttestation()) and requires all three to hold before treating a verdict as genuine:

  • an attestation row exists for (task_id, revision) — otherwise attestation_missing;
  • its verdict_sha256 matches the SHA-256 of the on-disk verdict.json bytes — otherwise attestation_mismatch;
  • its verifier_identity matches the verdict's own verifier_identity field — otherwise attestation_identity_mismatch.

cc-verifier.js's own idempotency cache (readAttestedVerdict()) applies the same first two checks before it will reuse a cached verdict instead of re-running checks — a verdict.json with no matching attestation is treated as absent, not as a cache hit.

To check store health directly:

node -e "
const Database = require('better-sqlite3');
const db = new Database(process.env.CC_VERIFIER_ATTESTATION_DB
  || require('os').homedir() + '/system/databases/cc-verifier-attestations.db',
  { readonly: true, fileMustExist: true });
console.log(db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM attestations').get());
db.close();
"

If this fails (file missing, not a database, or table missing), the store is unhealthy — see Section 7.2. writeAttestation() itself never throws (all failures are caught and swallowed): a write failure does not crash verify()/finalizeBlocked(), it only means that verdict will show as attestation_missing to the gate until the store is repaired and a fresh verify run is performed. This is deliberate fail-closed-for-the-gate, fail-open-for-the-builder-pipeline behavior — verification work is never blocked by attestation-store trouble, but the gate will not silently trust an unattested verdict either.

7.1 Same-OS-user trust boundary

The attestation store raises the bar for forging a verdict; it does not change the trust boundary. Both verdict.json and cc-verifier-attestations.db are ordinary files writable by whichever OS user runs cc-verifier.js/cc-verifier-gate.ts (no setuid, no separate service account, no OS-level ACL beyond normal file permissions). Any process running as that same user can, with better-sqlite3 and the schema in Section 7, hand-craft an attestations row with a verdict_sha256 that matches a hand-edited verdict.json — exactly as it could previously hand-edit verdict.json alone. The store's value is narrower than a same-user attacker: it converts a one-file edit into a two-artifact forgery (matching JSON bytes and a matching DB row), which is enough to catch accidental drift, partial edits, and non-adversarial tooling bugs, but it is not a defense against a same-user, same- privilege adversary with full filesystem access. Cross-user tampering (a different OS user, or a user without write access to ~/system/databases/) is out of scope for this store and is not claimed to be mitigated by it.

7.2 Integrity-mismatch recovery and reverification

attestation_missing, attestation_mismatch, and attestation_identity_mismatch are ordinary ok:false findings — they flow through the same mode-gated decide() path as revision_mismatch or digest_mismatch (Section 3) and, in observe mode, only audit. They do not indicate gate malfunction by themselves; they indicate the on-disk verdict is not attested at the store's current state. Recovery is always the same: re-run cc-verifier for the task at the current revision. There is no repair path that edits or re-derives an attestation row in place — getAttestation() never invents or fixes a row, and there is no supported "resync" operation; a fresh, trusted verify pass is the only way to re-establish attestation for a given (task_id, revision):

node tools/cc-verifier.js replay --task <id> --revision <sha>

If mismatches appear across many unrelated tasks at once (rather than one task after a targeted hand-edit), treat it as a store-health incident, not a per-task tamper event:

  1. Confirm the store file itself is intact — re-run the health check in Section 7 read-only query. A SqliteError/ENOENT there (as opposed to individual row mismatches) points to filesystem/disk trouble, a moved or deleted database file, or a botched migration, not tampering.
  2. Confirm CC_VERIFIER_ATTESTATION_DB is not accidentally pointed at a test/tmp path in the production environment (it is test-override-only; production should always resolve to the ~/system/databases/cc-verifier-attestations.db default).
  3. Once the store itself is confirmed healthy, mismatches are per-task and require the standard recovery above (fresh cc-verifier run) rather than any store-wide remediation.

7.3 Hard prerequisite for promotion

Sections 4's pilot-enforce/enforce-new promotion steps assume the attestation store is healthy. This is a hard, non-negotiable prerequisite, not an additional nice-to-have check: evaluate() treats attestation_missing/attestation_mismatch/attestation_identity_mismatch as ordinary ok:false findings, and in an enforcing mode ok:false for an enrolled/eligible task blocks mc.js ready (Section 4, last paragraph). If the attestation store is unhealthy (missing, corrupt, or unreachable) at the moment pilot-enforce/enforce-new is enabled, every verdict — including genuinely correct, untampered ones — will read as attestation_missing and be blocked. Before adding any task id to gate_pilot_enforce_task_ids or setting gate_enforce_new_watermark_epoch_ms:

  1. Run the Section 7 health check and confirm it returns a row count without error.
  2. Confirm the candidate task's own audit log entries (Section 2) show PASS outcomes with no attestation_* reasons at the current revision — a healthy store but a stale/never-attested verdict for this specific task still means "re-run cc-verifier first," not "promote anyway."
  3. If the store is unhealthy, fix it (Section 7.2) and obtain a fresh attested PASS before promoting — never promote to an enforcing mode "around" a known-unhealthy store on the theory that observe-mode telemetry looked fine; observe mode never blocks, so it cannot surface this failure mode the way an enforcing mode will.

Current-session hard-enforcement gap and required remediation

Finding

The verifier decision logic, durable handoff, attestation, and observe-mode ready-gate work as reviewed. However, changing gate_rollout_mode alone does not guarantee enforcement over every already-running or non-Claude session.

At the time of diagnosis, three native Claude Code processes were active and all had started before the latest ~/.claude/settings.json installation. The active Bilko task #105568 had no matching cc.verification_requested event. Hook presence in an already-running process is therefore not assumed without an explicit runtime handshake.

The current exact-revision ready gate is invoked by a Claude Code PreToolUse hook. It is not yet called authoritatively inside the central mc.js ready state transition. Consequently, a stale native session, Pi/non-Claude caller, direct MC invocation, or completion path that does not traverse Claude's Bash hook can bypass the session-local gate.

Local diagnosis artifact:

/Users/makinja/system/evidence/105472/ENFORCEMENT-GAP-CURRENT-SESSIONS.md

Required hard-enforcement architecture

  1. Move the authoritative exact-revision verifier check into the shared central MC ready transition, before any status mutation.
  2. Resolve task identity from the MC operation itself and repository/revision from trusted MC/project state, never from builder-authored payloads.
  3. For enrolled tasks, require a matching durable attestation and exact-revision PASS. If absent or stale, reject ready, enqueue trusted verification, and require retry after PASS.
  4. Apply the same invariant to done, merge, and deploy paths that can bypass ready.
  5. Keep the Claude PreToolUse hook as early operator feedback, not as the trust boundary.
  6. Register each spawned session with task ID, PID/session ID, repository, starting revision, and hook-version handshake so coverage is observable.
  7. Treat existing pre-watermark sessions as untrusted until they register or encounter the central state-transition gate; restarting or killing them is not required.
  8. Keep observe/non-enrolled flows fail-open. Once explicitly enrolled in pilot-enforce or eligible under enforce-new, central MC enforcement must fail closed if verifier identity, revision, verdict, or attestation cannot be established.

Corrected rollout statement

The installed system currently provides independently accepted observe-only verification and proven pilot-enforcement decision behavior. It must not be described as universal hard enforcement across all active sessions until the central MC transition remediation above is implemented and independently reviewed.

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