Skip to main content

Mobile Security

Mobile Security

Project: {{PROJECT_NAME}} Version: {{VERSION}} Date: {{DATE}} Author: {{AUTHOR}} Status: Draft | In Review | Approved Reviewers: {{REVIEWERS}}

Document History

Version Date Author Changes
0.1 {{DATE}} {{AUTHOR}} Initial draft

1. Mobile Threat Model

Threat Actor Goal Attack Vector Likelihood Impact Mitigation
Malicious app on device Steal auth tokens Shared storage access Medium High Secure storage (Keychain/Keystore)
Network interceptor (MITM) Intercept API calls Rogue WiFi, proxy Medium High Certificate pinning
Reverse engineer Extract API keys, business logic APK/IPA decompilation Medium Medium Code obfuscation, no hardcoded secrets
Stolen/lost device Access user data Physical access High High Biometric lock, data encryption, remote wipe
Rooted/jailbroken device Bypass controls OS privilege escalation Low High Root/jailbreak detection
Malicious insider Access user data Source code access Low High Secrets in vault, no PII in logs

Assets to protect:

  1. Auth tokens (access + refresh)
  2. User PII (name, email, payment info)
  3. API keys and secrets
  4. Cached sensitive data

2. Authentication

2.1 Biometric Authentication

Implementation: {{expo-local-authentication | react-native-biometrics}}

import * as LocalAuthentication from 'expo-local-authentication';

export async function authenticateWithBiometrics(): Promise<boolean> {
  const hasHardware = await LocalAuthentication.hasHardwareAsync();
  const isEnrolled = await LocalAuthentication.isEnrolledAsync();

  if (!hasHardware || !isEnrolled) {
    return promptPINFallback();
  }

  const result = await LocalAuthentication.authenticateAsync({
    promptMessage: 'Verify your identity',
    fallbackLabel: 'Use PIN',
    cancelLabel: 'Cancel',
    disableDeviceFallback: false,
  });

  return result.success;
}

Use cases for biometric auth:

  • App unlock after backgrounding > {{5 minutes}}
  • View sensitive data (payment info, full account number)
  • Confirm high-value transactions (amount > {{$100}})
  • Change security settings

Fallback: PIN code → {{expo-secure-store}} stored hash (bcrypt, not reversible)

2.2 Session Management

Property Value
Access token lifetime {{15 minutes}}
Refresh token lifetime {{30 days}}
Refresh token rotation Yes — single use, new token issued on use
Session timeout (background) App lock after {{5 minutes}} inactive
Max concurrent sessions {{3 devices}}
Force logout triggers Password change, suspicious activity, admin revocation

Token storage:

// CORRECT — encrypted secure storage
await SecureStore.setItemAsync('access_token', token, {
  keychainAccessible: SecureStore.WHEN_UNLOCKED_THIS_DEVICE_ONLY,
});

// WRONG — never use AsyncStorage or MMKV for tokens
// await AsyncStorage.setItem('access_token', token); // DO NOT USE

2.3 Token Storage (Secure Enclave)

Platform Mechanism Access Level
iOS Keychain Services kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly
Android Android Keystore BIOMETRIC_STRONG or DEVICE_CREDENTIAL

Cannot be backed up: Both mechanisms are device-bound — tokens do not transfer to new devices.

3. Data Protection

3.1 Secure Storage Policy

Data Type Allowed Storage Forbidden Storage
Access token Keychain/Keystore AsyncStorage, MMKV, SQLite
Refresh token Keychain/Keystore AsyncStorage, MMKV
Encryption key Keychain/Keystore Any other storage
User PII SQLite (encrypted) AsyncStorage
Non-sensitive prefs AsyncStorage / MMKV —

3.2 Data Encryption at Rest

Database encryption: {{SQLCipher for SQLite | Realm Encryption}}

// SQLCipher initialization with key from Keystore
const encryptionKey = await SecureStore.getItemAsync('db_encryption_key');
const db = await SQLite.openDatabaseAsync('app.db', {
  key: encryptionKey,
});

Key generation: On first launch, generate 256-bit random key, store in Keychain/Keystore.

Encrypted fields (beyond DB encryption):

Field Encryption Key Source
Payment card (last 4 only stored) N/A — tokenized Stripe/Braintree
SSN / national ID AES-256-GCM Keychain/Keystore
Private messages End-to-end (Signal protocol) Derived keys

3.3 Sensitive Data in Memory

Rule Implementation
Clear passwords after use Overwrite string variable, trigger GC
No sensitive data in logs Custom logger strips PII fields
No sensitive data in crash reports Sentry beforeSend hook scrubs payload
No sensitive data in analytics Map user ID → hashed ID before sending

3.4 Screenshot Prevention

// iOS — prevent screenshots programmatically
// (Note: React Native does NOT expose this API — native module required)

// Android — prevent screenshots and screen recording
import { Platform } from 'react-native';
import { preventScreenCapture, allowScreenCapture } from 'expo-screen-capture';

useEffect(() => {
  if (Platform.OS === 'android') {
    preventScreenCapture();
  }
  return () => allowScreenCapture();
}, []);

Screens requiring screenshot prevention:

  • Payment / card details screen
  • Account balance screen
  • Personal document viewer
  • {{OTHER_SENSITIVE_SCREEN}}

3.5 Clipboard Protection

  • Password fields: secureTextEntry={true} — disables clipboard by default on iOS
  • Sensitive data programmatically copied: clear clipboard after {{60 seconds}}
  • Custom clipboard hook: useSensitiveCopy(value, clearAfterMs: 60000)

4. Network Security

4.1 Certificate Pinning

Library: {{react-native-ssl-pinning | OkHttp certificate pinner (Android native) | URLSession (iOS native)}}

// Using react-native-ssl-pinning
const response = await fetch('https://api.domain.com/endpoint', {
  method: 'POST',
  pkPinning: true,
  sslPinning: {
    certs: ['api_cert_sha256_fingerprint'],
  },
  headers: { /* ... */ },
  body: JSON.stringify(payload),
});

Pinned endpoints:

  • api.{{domain.com}} — primary API
  • auth.{{domain.com}} — authentication

Certificate rotation process:

  1. Pin BOTH current cert and backup cert simultaneously
  2. Deploy app update with new cert added
  3. After old cert expires, remove old cert from pins
  4. Test rotation in staging first

Handling pin failures:

  • Log as security event to backend
  • Show user-facing error: "Secure connection failed"
  • Do NOT fall back to unpinned connection

4.2 SSL/TLS Configuration

Requirement Value
Minimum TLS version TLS 1.2
Preferred TLS version TLS 1.3
HTTP allowed No (ATS enforced on iOS, enforce on Android)
Cipher suites Forward-secrecy only (ECDHE, DHE)

4.3 Network Request Encryption

  • All requests over HTTPS (enforced via ATS + Android network security config)
  • Sensitive payloads encrypted at application layer (in addition to TLS): {{Yes/No}}
  • Request signing implemented (HMAC): {{Yes/No}}

5. Application Security

5.1 Code Obfuscation

Platform Tool Status
Android ProGuard / R8 (enabled by default in release) {{Done/TODO}}
iOS Bitcode + Swift compiler optimizations {{Done/TODO}}
JavaScript Hermes bytecode compilation {{Done/TODO}}
JavaScript (extra) {{metro-react-native-babel-preset obfuscation}} {{Done/TODO}}

ProGuard rules: android/app/proguard-rules.pro TODO: Review ProGuard rules to ensure no over-stripping of reflection-dependent code.

5.2 Root / Jailbreak Detection

Library: {{expo-device | react-native-jail-monkey | custom}}

import JailMonkey from 'jail-monkey';

export function checkDeviceIntegrity(): SecurityResult {
  const isJailbroken = JailMonkey.isJailBroken();
  const isDebuggedBuild = JailMonkey.isDebuggedMode();
  const onExternalStorage = JailMonkey.isOnExternalStorage(); // Android

  return {
    compromised: isJailbroken || isDebuggedBuild,
    reason: isJailbroken ? 'jailbroken' : isDebuggedBuild ? 'debug' : 'clean',
  };
}

Response to compromised device:

  • {{Warn user and allow use with reduced functionality | Block access entirely | Log silently}}
  • Justification: {{Explain decision}}

5.3 Tamper Detection

  • App bundle signature verification on launch
  • Resource hash verification for critical assets
  • Backend validates app version — block known compromised versions

5.4 Debug Detection

// Detect if app is running under debugger in production
if (__DEV__ === false && detectDebugger()) {
  logSecurityEvent('debugger_attached');
  terminateSession();
}

Production builds must have:

  • __DEV__ mode disabled
  • Console.log stripped (Babel plugin: transform-remove-console)
  • Flipper disabled
  • Source maps NOT bundled with the app binary (upload to Sentry separately)

5.5 Reverse Engineering Prevention

Measure Implementation
No hardcoded secrets All secrets fetched from vault at runtime or injected via CI
No plain API keys in bundle Obfuscated + fetched from secure config endpoint
Sensitive logic on server Business logic requiring security stays backend-side
Binary protection ProGuard / R8 (Android), Bitcode stripping (iOS)

TODO: Run MobSF static analysis before each major release and review findings.

6. OWASP Mobile Top 10 Checklist

# Risk Status Notes
M1 Improper Credential Usage {{Pass/Fail/N/A}} Tokens in Keychain, no hardcoded creds
M2 Inadequate Supply Chain Security {{Pass/Fail}} Dependency audit npm audit
M3 Insecure Authentication/Authorization {{Pass/Fail}} JWT validated server-side
M4 Insufficient Input/Output Validation {{Pass/Fail}} Zod validation on all inputs
M5 Insecure Communication {{Pass/Fail}} TLS + cert pinning
M6 Inadequate Privacy Controls {{Pass/Fail}} Data minimization, GDPR
M7 Insufficient Binary Protections {{Pass/Fail}} Obfuscation, no debug build in prod
M8 Security Misconfiguration {{Pass/Fail}} No dev configs in prod build
M9 Insecure Data Storage {{Pass/Fail}} Keychain/Keystore + encrypted DB
M10 Insufficient Cryptography {{Pass/Fail}} AES-256, SHA-256, no MD5/SHA-1

7. Security Testing Tools

Tool Type When Output
MobSF (Mobile Security Framework) Static analysis Pre-release Risk report
Frida Dynamic analysis Penetration test Runtime behavior
Objection Runtime analysis Penetration test Bypass checks
Burp Suite Network proxy Penetration test API vulnerabilities
OWASP ZAP Automated scan CI/CD Vulnerability report
npm audit / yarn audit Dependency scan Every PR CVE report

Penetration test cadence: {{Annual | Before each major release | Quarterly}} Last pentest date: {{DATE}} Next pentest date: {{DATE}}

8. Compliance Requirements

Requirement Applicable Notes
GDPR (EU users) {{Yes/No}} User data deletion, export endpoints
CCPA (California users) {{Yes/No}} Do Not Sell option
COPPA (under 13) {{Yes/No}} Parental consent flow
PCI DSS (payment data) {{Yes/No}} Use PCI-compliant SDK (Stripe/Braintree) — never store card data
App Store privacy label Yes App Store Connect privacy questionnaire
Play Store data safety Yes Google Play Console data safety form
HIPAA (health data) {{Yes/No}} BAA with vendors, encryption at rest+transit

Approval

Role Name Date Signature
Author
Mobile Lead
Security Lead
Legal

No comments to display

Back to top