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Security Sweep — Public Repository & alai.no Hardening (MC #107285)

Security Sweep — Public Repository & alai.no Hardening (MC #107285)

Date: 2026-08-16
Scope: johnatbasicas/alai-web, https://alai.no, and https://ucenje.alai.no
Production commit: 620dd3af082952b7dbded28a4c5b4685b5445366
Pull request: johnatbasicas/alai-web#2

Trigger

The source repository was public and exposed tracked CLAUDE.md and .claude/** files. A full sweep was ordered to identify and remove repository, deployment, secret-handling, browser, and production exposure risks.

Confirmed findings

  1. Public GitHub access exposed agent metadata and internal operational instructions.
  2. A stale index.html.bak file was publicly readable on alai.no.
  3. A hidden internal .credits.md file was publicly readable on ucenje.alai.no.
  4. Deprecated Vercel state contained expired OIDC tokens and duplicate local backups.
  5. A legacy unused mail dependency had high-severity advisories.
  6. GitHub Actions used mutable action tags; repository secret scanning and branch protection were unavailable or disabled.
  7. Pages lacked a true 404 response and a complete Content Security Policy.
  8. The contact proxy lacked bounded streaming input, complete validation, honeypot handling, safe upstream errors, and dynamic-response security headers.
  9. The GitHub Cloudflare deploy token was stale, causing repeated authentication failures.
  10. Wrangler debug logs contained local proxy shared-secret material and were too broadly readable.

Remediation completed

Repository and source

  • Changed the GitHub repository to private; anonymous raw access now returns 404.
  • Removed tracked CLAUDE.md, .claude/**, obsolete credential-setup instructions, and legacy Vercel/mail runtime files.
  • Removed expired Vercel token files, deprecated Vercel state/backups, vulnerable local dependencies, and ignored HTML backups.
  • Moved legitimate non-runtime documentation and verification sources outside deployable asset roots.
  • Removed an unrelated Azure DevOps remote from the local web repository.

Cloudflare Pages

  • Added .assetsignore protection to both Pages roots.
  • Added deterministic public-asset preflight validation and bypass regression tests.
  • Added real 404.html responses to both sites.
  • Added CSP, HSTS, nosniff, clickjacking, permissions, referrer, and cross-origin headers.
  • Removed Google-hosted font and analytics runtime dependencies instead of weakening CSP.
  • Kept ucenje static-only by isolating its Wrangler working directory.
  • Added edge tombstone redirects for the two stale cached sensitive paths; requests now resolve to 404.

Contact endpoint

  • Enforced JSON content type and an 8 KiB streaming body limit.
  • Added strict name/email/message validation and conservative email grammar.
  • Activated the existing honeypot.
  • Restricted browser origins and unsupported methods.
  • Added a 10-second upstream timeout and generic upstream failure responses.
  • Added no-store and complete security headers to dynamic responses.

CI and credentials

  • Pinned GitHub Actions to immutable commit SHAs.
  • Added Gitleaks, asset checks, Python regression tests, contact-function tests, and Dependabot.
  • Restricted Actions to selected actions with mandatory SHA pinning and read-only defaults.
  • Restored the valid scoped Cloudflare Pages token from the approved vault and updated GitHub Secrets without exposing the token.
  • Verified canonical CI deployment of both Pages projects.
  • Restricted Wrangler configuration/evidence permissions and removed debug logs containing proxy secrets.

Verification

  • Production Playwright gate: 21/21 PASS.
  • Browser console errors: 0.
  • Gitleaks current tree/history: 0 findings.
  • Semgrep OWASP/JavaScript: 0 findings.
  • Open Dependabot alerts: 0.
  • Canonical GitHub Actions deployment: SUCCESS.
  • Sensitive live paths: 404 after edge routing.
  • Repository visibility: PRIVATE.

Evidence

  • /Users/makinja/system/evidence/107285/final-security-sweep-report.json
  • /Users/makinja/system/evidence/107285/browser-verification.json
  • /Users/makinja/system/evidence/alai-web-security-sweep-20260816/FINAL-REPORT.md

Evidence directories are restricted to user-only access. No credential values are recorded in this page or its evidence summaries.

Residual low risks

  1. GitHub branch protection for a private repository requires a paid plan. Compensating controls are enabled: private visibility, selected SHA-pinned Actions, read-only workflow permissions, Gitleaks CI, web commit signoff, and merged-branch deletion.
  2. DNSSEC and CAA remain separate registrar/certificate-issuer changes and require a dedicated controlled rollout.
  3. The edge tombstone rules should remain until the old one-week cache lifetime has fully elapsed; then revalidate direct paths before considering rule removal.

Closure

Technical remediation and production verification are complete. This page is the task-specific BookStack record for MC #107285.

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