/sentry-security-review

Source: ~/.claude/skills/sentry-security-review/SKILL.md


name: security-review description: Security code review for vulnerabilities. Use when asked to "security review", "find vulnerabilities", "check for security issues", "audit security", "OWASP review", or review code for injection, XSS, authentication, authorization, cryptography issues. Provides systematic review with confidence-based reporting. allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob Bash Task license: LICENSE

Security Review Skill

Identify exploitable security vulnerabilities in code. Report only HIGH CONFIDENCE findings—clear vulnerable patterns with attacker-controlled input.

Scope: Research vs. Reporting

CRITICAL DISTINCTION:

Before flagging any issue, you MUST research the codebase to understand:

Do NOT report issues based solely on pattern matching. Investigate first, then report only what you're confident is exploitable.

Confidence Levels

Level Criteria Action
HIGH Vulnerable pattern + attacker-controlled input confirmed Report with severity
MEDIUM Vulnerable pattern, input source unclear Note as "Needs verification"
LOW Theoretical, best practice, defense-in-depth Do not report

Do Not Flag

General Rules

Server-Controlled Values (NOT Attacker-Controlled)

These are configured by operators, not controlled by attackers:

Source Example Why It's Safe
Django settings settings.API_URL, settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS Set via config/env at deployment
Environment variables os.environ.get('DATABASE_URL') Deployment configuration
Config files config.yaml, app.config['KEY'] Server-side files
Framework constants django.conf.settings.* Not user-modifiable
Hardcoded values BASE_URL = "https://api.internal" Compile-time constants

SSRF Example - NOT a vulnerability:

# SAFE: URL comes from Django settings (server-controlled)
response = requests.get(f"{settings.SEER_AUTOFIX_URL}{path}")

SSRF Example - IS a vulnerability:

# VULNERABLE: URL comes from request (attacker-controlled)
response = requests.get(request.GET.get('url'))

Framework-Mitigated Patterns

Check language guides before flagging. Common false positives:

Pattern Why It's Usually Safe
Django {{ variable }} Auto-escaped by default
React {variable} Auto-escaped by default
Vue {{ variable }} Auto-escaped by default
User.objects.filter(id=input) ORM parameterizes queries
cursor.execute("...%s", (input,)) Parameterized query
innerHTML = "<b>Loading...</b>" Constant string, no user input

Only flag these when:

Review Process

1. Detect Context

What type of code am I reviewing?

Code Type Load These References
API endpoints, routes authorization.md, authentication.md, injection.md
Frontend, templates xss.md, csrf.md
File handling, uploads file-security.md
Crypto, secrets, tokens cryptography.md, data-protection.md
Data serialization deserialization.md
External requests ssrf.md
Business workflows business-logic.md
GraphQL, REST design api-security.md
Config, headers, CORS misconfiguration.md
CI/CD, dependencies supply-chain.md
Error handling error-handling.md
Audit, logging logging.md

2. Load Language Guide

Based on file extension or imports:

Indicators Guide
.py, django, flask, fastapi languages/python.md
.js, .ts, express, react, vue, next languages/javascript.md
.go, go.mod languages/go.md
.rs, Cargo.toml languages/rust.md
.java, spring, @Controller languages/java.md

3. Load Infrastructure Guide (if applicable)

File Type Guide
Dockerfile, .dockerignore infrastructure/docker.md
K8s manifests, Helm charts infrastructure/kubernetes.md
.tf, Terraform infrastructure/terraform.md
GitHub Actions, .gitlab-ci.yml infrastructure/ci-cd.md
AWS/GCP/Azure configs, IAM infrastructure/cloud.md

4. Research Before Flagging

For each potential issue, research the codebase to build confidence:

Only report issues where you have HIGH confidence after understanding the broader context.

5. Verify Exploitability

For each potential finding, confirm:

Is the input attacker-controlled?

Attacker-Controlled (Investigate) Server-Controlled (Usually Safe)
request.GET, request.POST, request.args settings.X, app.config['X']
request.json, request.data, request.body os.environ.get('X')
request.headers (most headers) Hardcoded constants
request.cookies (unsigned) Internal service URLs from config
URL path segments: /users/<id>/ Database content from admin/system
File uploads (content and names) Signed session data
Database content from other users Framework settings
WebSocket messages

Does the framework mitigate this?

Is there validation upstream?

6. Report HIGH Confidence Only

Skip theoretical issues. Report only what you've confirmed is exploitable after research.


Severity Classification

Severity Impact Examples
Critical Direct exploit, severe impact, no auth required RCE, SQL injection to data, auth bypass, hardcoded secrets
High Exploitable with conditions, significant impact Stored XSS, SSRF to metadata, IDOR to sensitive data
Medium Specific conditions required, moderate impact Reflected XSS, CSRF on state-changing actions, path traversal
Low Defense-in-depth, minimal direct impact Missing headers, verbose errors, weak algorithms in non-critical context

Quick Patterns Reference

Always Flag (Critical)

eval(user_input)           # Any language
exec(user_input)           # Any language
pickle.loads(user_data)    # Python
yaml.load(user_data)       # Python (not safe_load)
unserialize($user_data)    # PHP
deserialize(user_data)     # Java ObjectInputStream
shell=True + user_input    # Python subprocess
child_process.exec(user)   # Node.js

Always Flag (High)

innerHTML = userInput              # DOM XSS
dangerouslySetInnerHTML={user}     # React XSS
v-html="userInput"                 # Vue XSS
f"SELECT * FROM x WHERE {user}"    # SQL injection
`SELECT * FROM x WHERE ${user}`    # SQL injection
os.system(f"cmd {user_input}")     # Command injection

Always Flag (Secrets)

password = "hardcoded"
api_key = "sk-..."
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY = "..."
private_key = "-----BEGIN"

Check Context First (MUST Investigate Before Flagging)

# SSRF - ONLY if URL is from user input, NOT from settings/config
requests.get(request.GET['url'])     # FLAG: User-controlled URL
requests.get(settings.API_URL)       # SAFE: Server-controlled config
requests.get(f"{settings.BASE}/{x}") # CHECK: Is 'x' user input?

# Path traversal - ONLY if path is from user input
open(request.GET['file'])            # FLAG: User-controlled path
open(settings.LOG_PATH)              # SAFE: Server-controlled config
open(f"{BASE_DIR}/{filename}")       # CHECK: Is 'filename' user input?

# Open redirect - ONLY if URL is from user input
redirect(request.GET['next'])        # FLAG: User-controlled redirect
redirect(settings.LOGIN_URL)         # SAFE: Server-controlled config

# Weak crypto - ONLY if used for security purposes
hashlib.md5(file_content)            # SAFE: File checksums, caching
hashlib.md5(password)                # FLAG: Password hashing
random.random()                      # SAFE: Non-security uses (UI, sampling)
random.random() for token            # FLAG: Security tokens need secrets module

Output Format

## Security Review: [File/Component Name]

### Summary
- **Findings**: X (Y Critical, Z High, ...)
- **Risk Level**: Critical/High/Medium/Low
- **Confidence**: High/Mixed

### Findings

#### [VULN-001] [Vulnerability Type] (Severity)
- **Location**: `file.py:123`
- **Confidence**: High
- **Issue**: [What the vulnerability is]
- **Impact**: [What an attacker could do]
- **Evidence**:
  ```python
  [Vulnerable code snippet]

Needs Verification

[VERIFY-001] [Potential Issue]


If no vulnerabilities found, state: "No high-confidence vulnerabilities identified."

---

## Reference Files

### Core Vulnerabilities (`references/`)
| File | Covers |
|------|--------|
| `injection.md` | SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, template injection |
| `xss.md` | Reflected, stored, DOM-based XSS |
| `authorization.md` | Authorization, IDOR, privilege escalation |
| `authentication.md` | Sessions, credentials, password storage |
| `cryptography.md` | Algorithms, key management, randomness |
| `deserialization.md` | Pickle, YAML, Java, PHP deserialization |
| `file-security.md` | Path traversal, uploads, XXE |
| `ssrf.md` | Server-side request forgery |
| `csrf.md` | Cross-site request forgery |
| `data-protection.md` | Secrets exposure, PII, logging |
| `api-security.md` | REST, GraphQL, mass assignment |
| `business-logic.md` | Race conditions, workflow bypass |
| `modern-threats.md` | Prototype pollution, LLM injection, WebSocket |
| `misconfiguration.md` | Headers, CORS, debug mode, defaults |
| `error-handling.md` | Fail-open, information disclosure |
| `supply-chain.md` | Dependencies, build security |
| `logging.md` | Audit failures, log injection |

### Language Guides (`languages/`)
- `python.md` - Django, Flask, FastAPI patterns
- `javascript.md` - Node, Express, React, Vue, Next.js
- `go.md` - Go-specific security patterns
- `rust.md` - Rust unsafe blocks, FFI security
- `java.md` - Spring, Java EE patterns

### Infrastructure (`infrastructure/`)
- `docker.md` - Container security
- `kubernetes.md` - K8s RBAC, secrets, policies
- `terraform.md` - IaC security
- `ci-cd.md` - Pipeline security
- `cloud.md` - AWS/GCP/Azure security

Revision #5
Created 2026-02-18 08:40:01 UTC by John
Updated 2026-06-21 20:01:07 UTC by John