Security Audit

Drop Security Audit (originally FontelePay) 
 
 Rebrand note: FontelePay was renamed to Drop. This audit predates the backend implementation and PSD2 pass-through architecture. Many issues identified here (localStorage PIN, client-side auth) have been addressed in the current backend. See docs/security/SECURITY-ARCHITECTURE.md for current security posture. 
 
 Date: 2026-02-05
 Auditor: John (AI Director)
 Scope: Full MVP application scan (pre-backend, client-side only) 
 
 Executive Summary 
 
 
 
 Category 
 Status 
 Issues 
 
 
 
 
 Dependencies 
 ✅ PASS 
 0 vulnerabilities 
 
 
 Hardcoded Secrets 
 ✅ PASS 
 None found 
 
 
 XSS Prevention 
 ✅ PASS 
 No dangerous patterns 
 
 
 Data Storage 
 ⚠️ WARNING 
 PIN in localStorage 
 
 
 Authentication 
 ⚠️ WARNING 
 Client-side only 
 
 
 Input Validation 
 ⚠️ WARNING 
 Minimal validation 
 
 
 
 Overall: ACCEPTABLE FOR MVP DEMO, NOT PRODUCTION READY 
 
 1. Dependency Audit 
 $ npm audit
found 0 vulnerabilities
 
 ✅ All npm packages are up to date with no known vulnerabilities. 
 
 2. Secret Management 
 Checked For: 
 
 Hardcoded API keys 
 Hardcoded passwords 
 Hardcoded tokens 
 .env files in repo 
 
 Findings: 
 ✅ No hardcoded secrets in source code
✅ No .env files committed
✅ Mock tokens are clearly labeled as mocks 
 Recommendation: 
 
 Create .env.example template for production 
 Use environment variables for real API keys 
 Add .env* to .gitignore (already present) 
 
 
 3. XSS Prevention 
 Checked For: 
 
 dangerouslySetInnerHTML 
 eval() 
 Direct innerHTML manipulation 
 
 Findings: 
 ✅ No dangerous DOM manipulation patterns found
✅ React's built-in XSS protection active 
 
 4. Data Storage (CRITICAL) 
 Issue: PIN Stored in localStorage 
 // AppContext.tsx:87
localStorage.setItem(STORAGE_KEY, JSON.stringify(user));
// user object includes plaintext PIN!
 
 Risk Level: HIGH for production 
 Why It Matters: 
 
 localStorage accessible via XSS attacks 
 localStorage persists after browser close 
 PIN visible in browser DevTools 
 No encryption 
 
 Fix Required for Production: 
 // Option 1: Never store PIN client-side
// Use server-side session + httpOnly cookies

// Option 2: Store hashed PIN (still not ideal)
import bcrypt from 'bcryptjs';
const hashedPin = await bcrypt.hash(pin, 10);

// Option 3: Use Web Crypto API
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
const data = encoder.encode(pin);
const hash = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', data);
 
 Immediate Mitigation: 
 
 For MVP demo: ACCEPTABLE (no real money) 
 For production: MUST implement server-side auth 
 
 
 5. Authentication Analysis 
 Current State: 
 
 ✅ PIN required for login 
 ✅ Wrong PIN rejected 
 ⚠️ No rate limiting on PIN attempts 
 ⚠️ No session expiry 
 ⚠️ No logout on inactivity 
 ❌ No server-side verification 
 
 OWASP Top 10 Review: 
 
 
 
 Vulnerability 
 Status 
 Notes 
 
 
 
 
 A01 Broken Access Control 
 ⚠️ 
 No server-side checks 
 
 
 A02 Cryptographic Failures 
 ❌ 
 PIN not hashed 
 
 
 A03 Injection 
 ✅ 
 React prevents XSS 
 
 
 A04 Insecure Design 
 ⚠️ 
 Client-only auth 
 
 
 A05 Security Misconfiguration 
 ✅ 
 N/A for static 
 
 
 A06 Vulnerable Components 
 ✅ 
 npm audit clean 
 
 
 A07 Auth Failures 
 ⚠️ 
 No rate limiting 
 
 
 A08 Data Integrity 
 ✅ 
 No deserialization 
 
 
 A09 Logging Failures 
 ⚠️ 
 No audit logging 
 
 
 A10 SSRF 
 ✅ 
 No server requests 
 
 
 
 
 6. Input Validation 
 Checked Areas: 
 
 
 
 Input 
 Validation 
 Status 
 
 
 
 
 Phone number 
 Length >= 6 
 ⚠️ Weak 
 
 
 OTP 
 Length === 6 
 ⚠️ No server verify 
 
 
 PIN 
 Length === 4 
 ✅ OK 
 
 
 Transfer amount 
 > 0, <= balance 
 ✅ OK 
 
 
 IBAN 
 None 
 ⚠️ Should validate format 
 
 
 Card number 
 Length === 16 
 ⚠️ No Luhn check 
 
 
 
 Recommendations: 
 
 Add IBAN format validation (checksum) 
 Add Luhn algorithm for card numbers 
 Add phone number format validation 
 Implement server-side validation 
 
 
 7. Production Readiness Checklist 
 Must Have Before Launch: 
 
 Server-side authentication (NextAuth.js or similar) 
 Hashed/encrypted PIN storage 
 HTTPS enforcement 
 Rate limiting on auth endpoints 
 Session management with expiry 
 Audit logging 
 Error monitoring (Sentry) 
 CSP headers 
 CORS configuration 
 
 Nice to Have: 
 
 2FA / MFA 
 Device fingerprinting 
 Anomaly detection 
 PCI-DSS compliance audit 
 
 
 8. Recommendations Summary 
 Immediate (Before any real users): 
 
 Move authentication to server-side 
 Hash PINs with bcrypt 
 Add rate limiting 
 
 Short-term (Before production): 
 
 Implement proper session management 
 Add audit logging 
 Setup error monitoring 
 Add input validation 
 
 Long-term (For compliance): 
 
 PCI-DSS audit for card handling 
 Penetration testing 
 Security certification 
 
 
 Conclusion 
 The Drop MVP (originally FontelePay) is acceptable for demonstration purposes but requires significant security improvements before handling real user data or money. 
 Key Risk: Plaintext PIN storage in localStorage 
 Mitigation: This is a mock/demo environment with no real financial transactions. All "money" is simulated. 
 Next Steps: Implement server-side auth before any production deployment. 
 
 Audit completed by automated security scan + manual code review.